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Abstract 
Minuscule discussion of research on institutional property-rights structure has rudimentarily determined the POS 
governance (usage and management) and its quality. Thus, two objectives are highlighted; (i) to examine Sabah’s 
current practice in urban-rural POS governance and (ii) explore the POS’ social dilemma that tied in with such 
institution. Reviews of interdisciplinary analytic perspectives, case study, documents and content analysis on semi-
structured interviews (governmental opinions) were performed. The practice with diverse rights structure is perceived 
as property-rights tragedy by virtue of numerous predicaments, which ensue in sub-optimal POS and quality of life 
issues. Therefore, re-engineering of urban-rural POS market via dynamic property rights re-assignment and 
contractual governance are postulated as the panacea to internalise the externalities for improved life quality.  
 
© 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Association of 
Malaysian Environment-Behaviour Researchers, AMER (ABRA Malaysia). 
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1. Introduction 
Perennial issues concerning the governance in terms of usage and conservation of idiosyncratic public 
open space (POS), have critically been debated with respect to livability (quality of life - Quality of life or 
livability can interchangeably be used as they are synonymous (Timmer & Seymour, 2005) which, focus 
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on present wellbeing (satisfaction & happiness) of individuals, unlike sustainability, it further 
concentrates on how to maintain the ‘good’ life to future generation.),  and sustainability of societies 
(Mansor, Said, & Mohammad, 2010; Nasution & Zahrah, 2012) i.e., saliently shown in Fig 1. By virtue 
of rampant demand and under-provision of  POS, such spatial attribute has encountered unprecedented 
market failures and negative aftermaths such as social and ecosystem degradation, overexploitation, and 
underinvestment. These POS’ quandaries are endangering the multidimensional quality of life and 
sustainable development, thence, calls for a transdisciplinary approach to serve as a keystone in 
sustainability science (Brandt et al., 2013). Albeit the significance of interdisciplinarity is emphasized, 
ironically, the underlying institutional perspective i.e., legal-economic property-rights analytic framework 
has scantly (Little research as compared to other factors like socioeconomic (e.g., types of housing), 
spatial planning (e.g., location-proximity, density, size, shape and size of space)) been researched (Quinn 
et al., 2010) particularly in POS context (Webster & Lai, 2003; Colding, 2013). The established ‘Coase-
inspired’ property rights paradigm (Coase, 1960) has extensively been deemed the model for analyzing 
social-ecological interactions (POS governance), particularly pertaining to actors’ behaviour and 
expectation in shaping its utilisation and management (Webster & Lai, 2003; Musole, 2009). Thus, as for 
the present study area which too confronts the aforesaid ecological issues that convincingly related to 
inefficient property institution, several doubts are posed like what and how is Sabah’s practice with 
regard to property rights structure view in POS governance and the conundrums associated with it? Due 
to the tension, property-rights-based approach coupled with transaction cost theory i.e., parts of New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) framework, (see, Coase, 1937, 1960; Williamson, 1975 and Chen & 
Webster, 2012) are commonsensibly employed as the crux in shedding new light (See also, Webster, 
2005) which; we endeavour to (i) examine Sabah’s current practice in urban-rural POS governance and, 
(ii) explore the POS’ social dilemma and negative externalities of Sabah’s status quo pertaining to  
practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1. Relationship between the POS and societies’ quality of life and sustainability 
Source: Adapted from Chiesura (2004) 
2. Institutional Property-Rights Structure Analytic Perspectives in POS Governance  
2.1. Theory and Review of Property-Rights Regimes and Bundle of Property Rights on POS 
In order to comprehend the property rights institution which is not institutionally-vacuum subsisted 
(Musole, 2009), particularly in resource domain governance, Buck (1998) argues, it is relevant to 
distinguish the constituents within the property structure which comprises property rights regimes and 
bundle of property rights. As for property regimes (about the rights of ownership and control allocation), 
quintessentially, there are four categories of regimes (Buck, 1998) but in reality, those regimes overlap 
(Ownership and management separately held by e.g., state and private respectively) each other instead 
(Satria, Matsuda, & Sano, 2006). Hanna et al., (1996) contends those regimes (Table 1) are critical 
institutions that organise the social-ecological interaction, more incisively, behavioural patterns and 
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actions of stakeholders’ are formed in determining the resources’ outcome. Besides, these institutional 
regimes are served as property rights determinant (Buck, 1998; Satria, Matsuda, & Sano, 2006) which; 
nevertheless the relationship can  likewise entail vice-versa. 
 
Table 1. Four types of property-rights regimes with owners’ rights, duties, ownership and access. 
 
Regimes Ownership Owner rights Owner duties Access 
Private property Individual Socially acceptable and 
access control 
Avoid socially 
unacceptable uses 
Closed 
Common property 
(public-closed access) 
Collective Exclusion of non-
members 
Maintenance- restrict 
the rate of use 
Group members 
only 
State property Government Determine rules Maintain social 
objective 
All 
Open-access resource 
(public-open access - 
Res nullius as 
“everybody’s property 
is nobody’s property” 
(Bromley, 1991). 
None None None All 
Source: Adapted and slightly modified from Hanna et al.,(1996) 
 
Generally, relative property rights are economic claims or ability (complemented by obligations) to the 
resources (benefit streams) either de jure or de facto authorized (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992) (Prime mover 
such de jure constraints: laws, policies, rules (enforced by government) while de facto (self-enforced) 
constraints: social norms, practice. Such initial rights assignment contingent on transaction cost). Within 
Schlager & Ostrom’s (1992) oeuvre viz. property rights typology, there are five economic rights 
colligated accordingly with different positions (Table 2) that becomes essential heuristic for the study 
area analysis. Additionally, scholars have posited such rights are institutionally significant (Key role in a 
market economy as externalities internalisation,  which  agents take the consequences into consideration) 
with respect to resources’ productivity, optimality and efficiency not only in traditional commons 
(agricultural, fisheries, and forestry) but also in modern/ neighbourhood commons namely POS (Webster, 
2007; Colding et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2013). 
 
Table 2. Bundle of property rights in resources that associated with different right-holders. 
Source: Adapted from Schlager & Ostrom (1992) 
 
Inasmuch as POS appears as public realm, rather it is left ungoverned, predominately, it is instead 
centralised and held under state property (claimant) (Garnett, 2012) who caters public goods to the 
society (user or entrants) via tax imposition especially Malaysia’s public space governance. Of course, 
Bundle of rights Collective-choice rights holders Operational-level rights holders 
Owner Proprietor Claimant Authorised user Authorised entrant 
Access (right to enter) x x x x x 
Withdrawal/ Use (right to obtain) x x x x  
Management (right to regulate 
use,  improve & monitor)  
x x x   
Exclusion (right to determine 
access rights) 
x x    
Alienation (right to sell or lease) x     
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some POS are, nonetheless, denationalized (Taiwan and Japan) .e.g., Privately Owned Public Space (POPS) 
or held under mixed or hybrid institution (Stockholm, Berlin and Cape Town, Colding et al., 2013). 
Anyhow, both property regimes and property rights are cogently interdependent in moulding the POS’ 
outcomes as rights and duties assignation, which is like an agreement or (informal/formal) ‘contract’ (Lee 
et al., 2013) between parties, determines human-ecological interaction respecting its natures of 
consumption and betterment whether it leads to the dilemma and livability issues, that will further be 
fleshed out in the following section. 
2.2. Property-Rights Structure, POS’ Social Dilemma, and Quality of life  
In light of the property rights that affirmed by Satria, Matsuda & Sano (2006), it indeed determines the 
type of goods of which, the POS’ economic goods is paradigmatically transformed from ideal pure public 
good into a common pool resource (CPR). Such CPR-based good is vulnerable to social dilemma (A 
situation where individual’s or private rationality/ interest and self-interestedness are at odds with the 
collective interests) (resource dilemma/ public goods problems - Overexploitation (maximising the 
individual’s gain that disregard the welfare of resources), shirking (avoiding the assigned duties), moral 
hazard (disincentive to guard against a risk when you are protected against it), free-rider (individuals 
benefit the services without paying the cost), underinvestment (e.g., underuse) (Hess, 2008; Altrichter & 
Basurto, 2008). All these plights could ensue in Pareto-inefficiency). Many scholars nem con asserted 
that, emergence of them are pertinent to the property rights failures i.e., the complex issues of security 
(Kim, 2004), definition (Coase, 1960), completeness (Baker, 2006; Nicita, Rizzolli, & Rossi, 2007), 
attenuation (robustness) (Furubotn & Pejovich, 1972), and adaptiveness of assignment (Webster & Lai, 
2003; Kim, 2004; Ostrom, 2008), of rights are substantial as they define the incentive (value) and 
(transaction) costs (Involving various dealing costs like technological, technical, institutional, financial 
costs (Webster & Lai, 2003) (positive/ high transaction cost impedes its allocation and 
enforcement/enforceability), willingness, ultimately the efficiency or enforceability and enforcement 
which simultaneously shapes individuals’ behaviour and anticipation (Buitelaar & Needham, 2007; 
Musole, 2009) whether to behave opportunistically (‘Self-interest seeking with guile’ (Williamson, 1975). 
Such strategy also embraces the preceding POS dilemma or even simply deviates or fails to fulfil the 
obligations. This is probably due to e.g., asset specificity) in POS market (quality and quantity). 
In the case of absence of rights recognition (either de jure or de facto), the unrecognised control and 
management rights holders on POS may perceive insecurity (as their rights are revocable) and be 
disincentivised to shirk or overuse. Besides, well-defined (clear) rights on POS do facilitate the 
enforcement and enforceability as ownership rights, obligations, and duration is specifically assigned to 
whose liability of internalisation and contrarily, ill-defined rights cause Hardinian’s common tragedy 
(Musole, 2009). Nevertheless, the clarity of the assigned rights and obligations (contract) is inevitably 
incomplete i.e., error, gaps, and ambiguities are discovered which, create ex-post opportunism (e.g., free-
riding) (Williamson, 2002). Moreover, property rights attenuation (Erosion of economic rights causes 
diminution of property or asset value (Libecap, 2003)) as resources protection mechanism for social 
welfare can yield rent (income) dissipation on the private entrepreneur (who will tend to deviate from the 
‘attenuated’ rights enforcement by shirking or overuse (Less incentive, and unavailability of resource in 
the future), if these costs are not in kind ‘compensated’). Mostly, commons like POS are mal-adaptively 
(Other than state property, common property or private property can also face social dilemma, for more 
details, see, (Wong, 2004)) governed e.g., as a state property of which the management rights (monitoring 
and provisioning) are unfeasibly exercised (high transaction cost (Meizen-Dick & Knox, 2001)). So, the 
government rather precede the economic goal over the environmental protection (Especially the 
developing countries e.g., Philippines , Malaysia  etc (Wong, 2004)). Foster (2011) further exhorted it as 
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‘regulatory slippage’ (government’s deficiency), in which, initial state regime is altered to open-access 
resource that ‘open’ for overuse, and this is fortified by Ellickson (1996) as “classic sites for tragedy”. 
 On top of that, the unenforceable or unenforced management (Colding et al., 2013) and exclusionary 
(Ostrom, 2005) rights due to the antecedent grounds, suffice to aggravate the POS’ conditions (become 
more rivalry) as unrestrained opportunistic behaviour of individuals (users) is incited that, they are 
‘invited’ e.g., to overexploit or free ride- (not paying tax/fees- unenforced obligation) the POS since, it 
appears ungoverned and their actions are unobserved, uncontrolled and more critically, the overused 
spaces are not recompensed and still left unkempt (Foster, 2011; Neuts, 2011). Additionally, such 
property-rights-triggered opportunistic behaviour (act rationally and independently- no cooperation 
between parties) that poses numerous POS dilemma and social costs to others, which can be elucidated in 
game theory of Prisoner Dilemma (PD) analysis are tenably underpinned by two seminal tragedy theories 
of Commons and uncommon Anticommons respectively.  
Firstly, Hardinian’s metaphor on Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968), it is a circumstance in 
which, multiple individuals are endowed with inexhaustible using and accessing rights (freedom) to the 
given resource without any cost effective means to monitor (management right) and constrain (exclude 
right) others’ uses; consequently, the diminishable resource is doomed to overuse (maximizing the 
greatest gain) that leads to degradation of the resource. Next, symmetrically, an axiom of Heller on 
Tragedy of the Anticommons (Heller, 1998) may likewise be invoked that, multiple individuals (owners) 
hold rights to exclude others from a finite resource (POS) and no one including the owners (even though 
they have use rights but still, it is prevailed over by the strong exclusionary rights of some co-owners), in 
practice, exercises an effective privilege of access and use rights, thence, resulting the resource to be 
underused (Heller, 1998) or underinvested and left idle (Kosnik, 2012). In pursuit of clearer views on how 
POS’ quality is affected, various forms of social dilemma are illustrated as follows; individuals may 
overuse the space for illegal functions e.g., waste disposal site (Kassa, 2008; Garnett, 2012), low-cost 
condominium houses, squatting and sleeping place for street children and vagabonds (Kassa, 2008), or 
vandalism (Kassa, 2008; Garnett, 2012) i.e., parks and equipments are left desolate and broken (Kassa, 
2008; Strathilevitz, 2010; Foster, 2011), which, bring panhandling and loitering, littering, and graffiti 
issues (Ellickson, 1996; Foster, 2011; Garnett, 2012), dogs park issue (unclean condition e.g., dogs’ 
faeces) (Matisoff & Noonan, 2012) and overcrowded (Webster, 2007). All these misconducts drive the 
degraded POS deemed unsafe and insecure (criminal activity), dirty, unattractive, congested (queuing and 
conflict-resolution costs), and derelict space which, hypothetically, pose quality of life problems.  From 
the social perspective, wretched POS causes unhealthy or passive lifestyle because people are deprived of 
recreational activities, which manifold illnesses like obesity, heart-attack, distress, and social 
disintegration (no interactions- poor communication and relationship) are unfolded. In addition, 
adversities of ecosystem and economy like exposure to ecological harms i.e., pollutions, ambient 
temperature escalates, and medical costs increase- sicknesses, degraded neighbouring property values, 
income loss- low business and employment are resulted correspondingly. Ergo, the property-rights-
triggered POS’ dilemma and negative externalities are plainly detrimental to the quality of life and 
sustainability of society, more incisively, interwoven wellbeing of milieu, social and cultural, and 
economic that consist of physical, psychological, community health aspects are pertained (Morris, 2003; 
Byrne & Sipe, 2010). However, such relationship of institutional POS’ dilemma and quality of life is 
portrayed in Fig 2. 
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Fig 2. Institutional property-rights structure as the determinant of  quality of life 
Source: Adapted and slightly modified from Gerber et al.,(2009) 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1. The study area 
 
Capital city of Kota Kinabalu (KK) that surrounded by about 400 territorial POS (in 2013) (Including 
community park, playground, sport area, promenade, garden, sidewalk and plaza) within Country land 
including Native land (rural) and Town land (urban) with an approximate area and population of 351 km2 
and 452,058 (in year 2010) respectively which, falls within the West Coast division of Sabah, Malaysia 
(Fig 3), was selected as the site study. Both headquarters of KK Lands and Surveys Department (LSD) 
and City Hall (CH) were focused as their verdicts made with regard to practice in POS governance are 
constitutionally enforced in all other districts of the State. The scope was solely delimited to 
governmental perception as they are the key informants (policy-makers). 
Property-rights issues: Attenuation (Robustness), Insecurity, Incompleteness (Uncertainty), Ill-
defined (Clarity), Maladaptive (unsuitability) of alignment 
Quality of Life Issues 
Public policy (De jure) + Social 
Custom and Practice (De facto) 
Property-Rights Structure 
Property-Rights Regimes:  
Open access resource, Common 
property, State property, Private 
property 
Bundle of Property Rights: 
Alienation, exclusionary, 
management, use, access 
rights 
Actors: Land developer, users, state and local authority, residents, land officers, landowners 
Types of Resource Domain: POS 
POS' Dilemma: 
Overuse, Misuse, Underinvestment, Shirking, Free-riding, Moral Hazard, 
Tragedy of the Commons(Overuse) and Anticommons(Underuse) 
Market failures and Negative Externalities:  
environmental, social, and economic costs 
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Fig 3. (a) Map showing location of KK, Sabah, Malaysia 
3.2. Data collection and data analysis  
This paper employs an in-depth case study strategy to exemplify Sabah’s practice on POS governance 
and its POS’ dilemma that appertains to livability issues. This explorative strategy can comprehend the 
complex issue via panoptic discourse and contextual analysis (Sarker, Ross, & Shrestha, 2008). As for the 
first objective, besides the secondary data collection, viz. journals, conference proceedings, local 
government POS report and presentations, archival search i.e., random POS’ title deed search, offer 
letters, legal document reviews e.g., Sabah Land Ordinance (SLO) 1950, Federal Constitution (FC), Local 
Government Ordinance (LGO) 1961, websites, maps, a case law, however, primary data were 
complementarily gathered via semi-structure interviews (face to face technique) on two local authority 
officers of CH and four purposive and snowball sampled land officers of LSD respectively, in which, a 
question was inquired; what and how does the current practice of POS governance operate? As for the 
second objective, apart from the literatures of property rights issues, public goods problems, resource 
dilemma, and aforementioned secondary data in the former objective, it was hitherto garnered via pilot 
test on two local government officers and land officers from different organisations, CH and LSD 
respectively. Semi-structured interviews (via phone calls and emails) were conducted. All respondents 
were posed with same questions; what and how are the POS’ problems emerged from the practice? Their 
responses were recorded in the verbal and texts forms. Document (content) analysis on public records 
(title deeds i.e., special terms and covenants of open space) was performed. Furthermore, qualitative 
content analysis were executed on the interviews data  in which, they were codified accordingly to the 
key themes e.g., POS’ problems. Nonetheless, limitations were still keyed out like time-consuming and 
costly during data acquisition process including the phone calling, and travelling costs.  
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4. Result and Discussion  
4.1. Diverse property-rights structure characteristics in POS governance 
The result of the first objective shows that, Sabah’s current practice in POS governance is delineated 
by letter of offer and title deed system i.e., POS’ title deed  and offer letter are only granted on Country 
Lease (CL) and Town Lease (TL) while the Native Title, (NT) POS would be otherwise. All the 
respondents acknowledge such long-established practice, formally, since 1995, especially the issuance of 
title deed upon the CL’s,  and TL’s POS are mainly due to the direction of the LSD’s director, and 
presupposing that, it prima facie abides by the legal institutions i.e., Article 13 of FC and section 40 of 
SLO on subdivision of land, providing that, “no person shall be deprived of property…” and “…issue 
such titles on the terms of original title” respectively. Thereof, POS’ title shall be issued, of which has 
been evidenced in the case of Sabindo Nusantara Sdn Bhd & Anor v Majlis Perbandaran Tawau & Ors 
[2011] 8 MLJ 653 but these provisions imperceptibly do not impose on the NT’s POS. Even with the 
granted POS’ title, it is only temporal as it subjects to mandatory transfer to local government i.e., owners 
are still divested of property, or he no longer owns the property (POS) whenever the owner’s covenant is 
fulfilled in accordance with Sabindo’s case (will further be discussed below). It is, thus, sceptical that 
such practice is conforming to the essence of the above provisions. However, it is not the study’s interest 
to investigate this; rather, how does the practice shape the property-rights in POS governance is more 
vitally concerned. 
 Pursuant to section 4 of SLO, state land means “all lands …or which have not been and may not 
hereafter be leased or granted to …” This connotes that, the NT’POS which does not have a title is clearly 
a state property. However, it is further added by section 5 “…land reserved for public purpose is and shall 
be vested solely in the Government”. Since the open space is meant for the public use e.g., for public 
recreational purpose (see, TCPO), the ownership and management rights of all types of POS (regardless 
of NT, CL or TL)  shall be held by the government (as a state property- state and local government act as 
one entity in property-rights regime context, see Hanna et al., 1996) but with attenuated rights (without 
exclusion and alienation rights) (see, Musole, 2009). As for the titled POS, the management and 
ownership rights are determined by the title possession, more precisely, site transferability i.e., if the title 
and site are yet to be transferred, and still held by e.g., a developer who is also an owner, then he should 
bear the initial POS development and management obligations. Veritably, such management duty is 
aligned by the title’s prerequisite stating that, such duties shall be enforced up to the local authority’s 
satisfaction only then the compulsory title transfer to government is permitted. This is too substantiated 
by Sabindo’s case, based on the Modified Torrens System, albeit the individual retains the POS’ title, it 
does not inevitably entail ownership; instead, it is more towards a trusteeship who is duty-bound to 
execute the transfer to local authority (beneficiary) especially after fulfilling the management 
responsibility. Note that, even the title transfer has not been undertaken, so long as the management of 
developer has accomplished the local authority’s requirement, the site transfer is allowable, and if it were 
attempted or executed, then it entails that, he (‘bare’ trustee) has officially relinquished the ownership and 
management rights to the local authority. In addition to the titled POS, in some districts such as Kota 
Kinabalu or Penampang, common property regime is optionally countenanced for some POS (mostly in 
residential POS) especially only after the site or title has been handed over to the local government i.e., 
the users or residents of the POS can voluntarily establish a committee through registration with the local 
government that they are willing to co-manage the POS (as monitors). This entails the management by 
two different entities (private and government) can co-exist. This phenomenon is also congruent with the 
arguments of some scholars (Buck, 1998; Satria, Matsuda & Sano, 2006; Colding et al., 2013) that an 
overlapped/ mixed regime is observed (i.e., ownership is held by the government while the management 
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right is held by both government and public users). As for the NT’s POS (state property), the management 
duty shall legally be vested in or allocated to local government based on section 49(1)(53) of LGO, that 
they should manage it for the citizens (taxpayers). Succinctly, consistent with Musole’s (2009) idea, 
indeed Sabah’s property-rights in POS governance cannot be institutionally vacuumed, in lieu, it is a 
practice-based rights i.e., the composite practice causes the property-rights structure diverseness in urban-
rural POS governance (Table 3). This likewise corroborates that the urban plan which backed by 
institutions (state land and planning constitution), is like a contract (agreement) as it involves the rights 
and duties exchanges or allocations to individuals on resources governance (Lee et al., 2013). 
 
Table 3. A de jure overview of diverse property rights and regimes positions of Sabah’s POS governance. 
* only certain districts or POS adopt such regime (optional) 
4.2. Institutional rights structure arises urban-rural POS’ dilemma and livability issues 
Whilst, as for the second objective’s pre-test result, tersely, Sabah’s practice-based diverse property-
rights (Table 3) that embrace contestations like rights mal-alignment of state property, rights attenuation, 
and incompleteness of rights, obligations and sanctions have indeed triggered the urban-rural POS 
dilemma (due to less incentive and unenforceable issues). Such position is supported by the CH’s 
respondents that, roughly 40 percent of the total 400 rivalry state-owned POS are not in favourable 
condition which, involve vandalised equipments and broken infrastructure e.g., damaged fence, 
overgrown grass, spaces illegally become a house-extension, dumping ground, car-park, vegetation, and 
overcrowded issues especially in urban spaces as well as, illegal exclusion on spaces added by the LSD 
respondent. Dozens of complaints have also been lodged by users who are clearly deprived of the medium 
for recreation and socialising, about un-mown bushes, and water-logged ground of playground have 
invited snake, and has become a breeding ground for pest and insects especially mosquitoes, thus, both 
posed a security and health menace to the neighbourhood.  
Under the state-managed POS, the management efficiency is primarily relying on the budget 
allocation, but sadly, fiscal crisis is unavoidably confronted which has induced some under-provisioned 
POS. This indicates positive transaction cost (fiscal issue) (Webster & Lai, 2003) indeed becomes an 
 POS’ Status 
 
 
 
 
Property-Rights  
Structure 
CL & TL’s POS 
 
(Un-transferred title) 
 
 
(Un-transferred site) 
CL & TL’s POS 
 
(Un-transferred title) 
 
 
(Transferred site) 
(Titleholder as a ‘bare 
trustee’) 
CL & TL’s POS 
 
(Transferred title) 
 
 
(Transferred site) 
NT’s POS 
 
(Without title) 
 
 
(Needless site 
transfer) 
Land ownership: Private/ Common Property State property State property State property 
Management: Private / Common Property 
(Developer/ Landowner(s)) 
Government ( Local 
government)/ (Local 
Government+ Common 
property- residents/users 
(registered)* 
Government (Local 
government)/ (Local 
Government+ Common 
property- residents/users 
(registered)* 
Government 
(Local 
government)  
(vested in) 
Positions: 
Bundle of rights: 
Claimant 
 
Claimant 
 
Claimant 
 
Claimant 
 
Access x x x x 
Withdrawal x x x x 
Management 
Exclusion and 
Alienation 
x 
None 
x 
None 
x 
None 
x 
None 
Public access and 
withdrawal rights 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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impediment to local authority to enforce the management rights on the urban-rural POS (shirking issue- 
inefficient management and monitoring system). This is certainly a form of regulatory slippage (Foster, 
2011) in which, a transformation from legal state regime to de facto open access resource of POS is 
elusively taken place that can actually exacerbate the condition of spaces  which, users’ opportunism 
triggered off due to government unenforced rights. This is even concerted by the CH’s respondents that, 
urban POS (Congestion during peak hours (weekend) or special events. Also at the famous Gaya Street 
and Filipino night market) e.g., promenade or city park (minority) conditions are more superior than the 
community park in a residential area because guards are hired to do surveillance task i.e., to monitor users 
behaviour on the urban space utilisation which is a part of a management right, while, less or no 
surveillance and maintenance are afforded for the residential commons (majority and financially 
infeasible - The users tend to overuse or commit to moral hazard (not to protect since, the state  or local 
government protects-manage it)). Moreover, within the Sabindo’s case, the POS had been used by the 
government for commercial shop lots and, even some spaces in KK also faced the similar fate added by 
the respondent. This means some spaces may opportunistically be overused for private purpose by the 
government especially, the ownership is retained under them. Besides, under-specified rights and 
obligations (Understatement contingencies e.g., what happen if it is undermanaged and overused as there 
are ambiguous terms such as POS definition and execution of transfer, use and management rights (the 
extent of utilisation and management)). within the informal ‘contract’, users, owners or government, they 
may ‘tempt’ to misbehave on the spaces, see, Williamson’s (2002) incomplete contract (rights and 
obligations) that leads to ex-post opportunism. Furthermore, while the title deed is still in the hand of 
private suppliers, the trustees may necessarily think they are the ultimate owners like the Sabindo’s case, 
so, they may utilise the space as they prefer. The land officer agrees with that, some spaces that owned by 
3 to 5 co-owners (residents), are prohibited to be used by public especially in the residential community 
park (not physical seclusion, but via verbal and written warnings) in which, it contravenes the policy and 
essence of ‘publicness’. This may trigger dissatisfaction of others for being excluded to consume. Albeit 
with multiple exclusions, this situation cannot be identical to Heller’s Anticommons Tragedy because the 
spaces are surprisingly well-maintained. This is possible within such exclusionary scheme if the common 
property regime (Ostrom, 1990; Colding et al., 2013) were ‘effectively’ enforced i.e., neither over-
exclusion nor overexploitation.  
Next, the privately-managed (claimant-Rights attenuation affects their behavior on the governance of 
the resource, Furubotn & Pejovich, 1972) which, they are often dis-incentivised.) who do not possess the 
full-ownership on the POS, and are adhered to mandatorily transfer it to local authority after satisfying the 
obligations, may be  incentivised  to shirk, and overuse because they think the ‘bare’ rights does not 
confer any incentive (not even single penny from the users; instead, all revenues go to the government), 
which at last to be handed over, so, what is the purpose for overhauling it? This is also agreed by the 
LSD’ respondents that, this practice is cumbersome and unrealistic as owners may find it difficult that, 
they do not only have to invest, but also transfer them, in which, all the cream of the crop will fully be 
reaped by the government. So, they may not willingly or reluctant to enforce the management rights and 
most importantly, it is not their property, like CH’s respondents argued that, some developers delayed the 
maintenance until the eleventh hour prior to the transfer (which caused the spaces were interim left 
unmanaged). Like an adage “give a man the secure possession of bleak rock, and he will turn it into a 
garden; give him nine years lease of a garden, and he will convert it to a desert...the magic of property 
turns sand into gold” (Brubaker, 1998). Additionally, since users are not the owners, they are prone to 
overuse, or act moral hazard like the antecedent state-managed POS situation as “one household only 
shovels the snow outside’s one’s door. No one cares about the frost above the roofs of others’ home” 
(Chinese byword). Noticeably, regardless of state or privately-managed POS, due to the property-rights 
failures, all has practically become open-access resource (like the de facto ill-defined rights issue (Coase, 
626   Gabriel H.T. Ling et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  153 ( 2014 )  616 – 628 
1960; Musole, 2009) in which, Tragedy of urban-rural POS is posed. This can also be clarified by the PD 
model (Table 4), to showcase the self-interested or opportunistic users might not cooperate- improper 
utilize (harm or overexploit others for their short-run sake), even if it appears that it is in their best 
interests to do so in long term perspective.  
 
Table 4. Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) appertains to Hardinian’s Tragedy of urban-rural POS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Fennell (2011) 
 
As for the categories II and III, myopic users prefer to overuse the POS without concerning others’ 
interest (gain the most benefits/ higher payoff, but others (co-operators) bear the cost and, POS may still 
be degraded). In category I, users are cooperative, which POS is well-conserved/ moderately used (both 
can enjoy it) while, in reality, the category IV is eventually revealed in which, both will defect, then POS 
are much/ severely degraded (both are suffered- dissatisfied as unable to use). Therefore, all these 
institutionally-triggered opportunisms and self-interestedness on the urban-rural POS that confirmed 
Hanna et al., (1996) and Schalger & Ostrom (1992) purviews that property institution indeed matters in 
social-ecological interaction particularly, pertaining to POS’ conditions, have plausibly posed quality of 
life issues. A salient connection between Sabah’s institutions, POS’ dilemma and life quality, can 
somewhat be analogous to the conceptual framework of Fig 2.  
5. Conclusion  
In a nutshell, this study has established the property-rights structure diverseness of Sabah’s present 
practice in urban-rural POS governance. A relationship between such institution of POS governance and 
quality of life is likewise unveiled i.e., various institutional triggered social dilemma are posed. These 
findings have thereof bridged the lacuna of property-rights in new commons, POS and livability issue, in 
which, insights are illuminated to the public officials and private suppliers that, such institution is a sine 
qua non in determining an individual’s behaviour in governing the POS. Of course, it can be employed as 
the potential cure-all to internalise the current POS market failure externalities i.e., re-assignment of 
rights especially management rights (Colding et al., 2013) and exclusionary rights (Ostrom, 2005) based 
on Institutional Analysis Development (IAD) (Ostrom, 1990). Several mechanisms are purported as the 
dilemma’s solutions such as an approach by the Nobel Laureate, Ostrom (1990) on common-property-
based 8 principles of self-governing and organising the resource. The fundamental is a particular group is 
assigned rights to control and manage the POS (collective action) e.g., Home Owner Association, (HOA), 
but it may also require Leviathan state intervention (as monitor) via contractual arrangement (Chen & 
Webster, 2006). The entire idea is to introduce a club good (With exclusionary move, it inhibits 
rivalrouness (for members only, not public), then the resource is less degraded (less congested and 
efficiently managed and monitored) and more sustaining, Webster & Lai, 2003; Ostrom, 2005). concept 
(Buchanan, 1965) instead of CPR. This approach seems probable as the preceding community parks 
showed a positive result, instead of Anticommons tragedy occurrence. Besides, Williamson’s (2002) firm 
theory is also advocated to govern the unavoidably incomplete contract especially the implicit obligations 
Prisoner B (collaborates) Prisoner B (betrays) 
Prisoner A (collaborates) Each imprisoned 1 year     (I) 
 
Prisoner A: 3 years               (III) 
Prisoner B: goes free 
Prisoner A (betrays) Prisoner A: goes free Prisoner B: 3 years            (II) Each imprisoned 2 years       (IV) 
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and sanctions, and terms of the POS’ title which are asset specificity that both are likely subject to ex-post 
opportunism. Thus, those ameliorations should necessarily be affirmed in future researches. Also, other 
stakeholders’ perceptions (users and developers) on the current practice towards the POS’ dilemma are 
worthily explored.  
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